permit if the person's nationality is Finnish, i.e. he or she is not a Finnish citizen but is of Finnish origin in terms of ethnic background'.
2 Following Koivisto's decision, Finnish lawmakers were faced with the problem of how Ingrian Finns' "Finnishness" could be identified. Ancestry, cultural identification and other identity markers like language and religion were all discussed in this context, and specific qualifications for Ingrian Finns to prove their ethnic Finnish background and/or connection to Finland were introduced into Finland's main immigration law, the Aliens Act, in 1991 Act, in , 1996 Act, in and 2002 Act, in -2003 These qualifications became increasingly restrictive with each addition, until the Ingrian Finnish migration queue was closed in 2010.
In this article we examine how Finnish politicians constructed religion as an element of Finnishness, and how politicians initially used membership of the Lutheran Church in Russia and Estonia as proof of Ingrian Finns' Finnishness and thus appropriateness for returnee migrant status. We also note how religion soon disappeared from the political discourse, and analyse how ethnicity supplanted religion as an identity marker. Finally, we discuss the reasons and consequences of this change for the construction of the Ingrian Finns' Finnish identity. We argue that instead of the more open nature of religion (church membership is not limited to a particular group), the essentialist definitions of identity provided a better strategic resource for MPs arguing against the Right to Return. Thus, the article demonstrates (a) how discursive constructions of identity can acquire opposite effects depending on the context of their presentation, and (b) how the content of political identity discourses is less important than the framing of these discourses as primordial characteristics rather than reflexive capabilities.
The Ingrian Finnish case presents some unique aspects for analysis of migration discourse, given the particularities of Finland's migration history. Finland lacks the same post-war history of immigration as many other western European states, and thus unlike other examples of European returnee migrants, the political discussion on Ingrian Finns was not focused on comparisons to other migrant groups. The absence of large migrant communities in Finland gave space for Finnish politicians to link primodial identity constructions to national identity without much push-back.
In addition to Koivisto's April 1990 interview, our empirical material consists of 48 speeches/statements by Finnish MPs and ministers during parliamentary discussions regarding the drafting and amendment of the Aliens Act and other relevant legislation. Our focus is on the utterances which refer to the integration capability of the Ingrian Finns. The choice of excerpted texts in the analysis below reflects this focus. In addition, we examine the legislation related to the Right to Return policy. We have analysed these using a tailored version of critical discourse analysis (CDA).
After discussing our theoretical and methodological premises, we provide a brief background history of Finnish-Ingrian Finnish relations. Second, we examine how religion-Lutheranism to be precise-became one of the constituting aspects of the Ingrian Finns' Finnishness. Third, we show how other aspects of ethnic identity supplanted religion as a frame of reference when discussing the Ingrian Finns' integration capability. Fourth, we examine how these 'primordial' ethnic identity markers were later used to argue against the Ingrian Finns' integration capability. Finally, we suggest reasons for why the described 'secularisation' and ethnicisation happened in the political context of Finland between 1990 and 2010.
National and Ethnic Identity and the Analysis of Political Discourse
The impact of Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities (1979) has been so extensive that it seems almost superfluous to assert that national identity is a social construct. Yet it is exactly this 'common-senseness' that invites clarity about one's position. There are four issues that we want to discuss in this section, in order to position our theoretical and methodological approach.
First, although in scholarly discourse 'identity' is commonly understood as a product of processes of social construction (Hjelm 2014) , the everyday use of the word has made it a fuzzy concept. Hence there is sometimes a tendency to reify identity as something essential to an entity-in this case, 'the nation'-even in critical accounts. To sensitise ourselves to this, we take seriously Jean-François Bayart's suggestion that 'there is no such thing as identity, only operational acts of identification ' (2005, 92) . This view is echoed in Brubaker and Cooper's (2000) account of identity, and like them we want to retain the concept while treating identity as a continuous process and, indeed, struggle.
Second, although there are valid reasons for differentiating between ethnic and national identity, we use them interchangeably in this article. Our empirical material conflates the two: a 'person's nationality is considered Finnish' if 'they are of Finnish origin in terms of ethnic background'.
3 Within our framework the interesting detail is how constructions of national identity become suffused with what were considered more essential, i.e. 'ethnic' qualities.
The conflation between ethnic identity and national identity has several problematic consequences, chiefly the potential for marginalising those who claim membership of a nationality but have a different ethnic identity, such as second-generation immigrants. This presents an interesting dimension to our study, in that political discussions of Ingrian Finnish exclusion and inclusion in national and ethnic identity become a statement of Finland's own national identity and its relationship to ethnic identity, with relevance for other communities in Finland. It is interesting to note the period of our study is also a period of increasing migration diversity in Finland, as communities of African and Middle Eastern decent became larger and more visible in Finnish cities. The problem of "ethnicising" national identity therefore has broad consequences for defining belonging in Finland.
Third, as Wodak et al. (1999) , Mole (2007) , and others demonstrate, discourse analysis in its various forms is perfectly suited to examine the processes of identification mentioned above. Hjelm (2014, 6) argues that discourse theory and its operationalisations fit a dynamic view of identity construction particularly well because of the 'action orientation' of discourse. That is, discourse analysis is not only interested in what is being said, but more importantly how things are done with discourse. Wodak et al. (1999, 8) argue that in the context of national identity, discourse analysis can 'throw light on the largely contingent and imaginary character of nation and … sharpen awareness of dogmatic, essentialist and naturalising conceptions of nation and national identity'.
Finally, building on the theoretical base of identity as construction/identification, and theorisations of discourse, our methodological approach draws from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), broadly understood. While subscribing to the basic constructionist tenets discussed above, CDA provides a toolkit that can be shaped in many ways with a variety of foci. Our apparatus concentrates on the analysis of meaning instead of a more-fine-grained linguistic analysis. This is done by focusing on meaningful packages of claims and articulations and their contextualisations within party politics and the broader social context. Through an analysis of meaning-construction we identify (implying an active process of construction) different discourses, or ways of talking, which 'designate both the relevant area of knowledge, and the particular way it is constructed' (Fairclough 1992, 128) . In addition, when relevant we look at the rhetorical aspects of the parliamentary discourse, that is, how a particular type of discourse is made persuasive. Finally, on the level of grammar, we examine lexis, or word choice, which is particularly important when it creates a sense of 'us' and 'them' (Richardson 2007 ).
Our discourse analytical focus differs from most CDA-influenced analyses in the important sense that while CDA often focuses on the ideological suppression of alternative discourses in favour of one hegemonic discourse (Fairclough 1992) , our aim is to look at the variety of discourses offered as descriptions of Finnishness. We are, however, no less concerned with 'meaning in the service of power' (Thompson 1990, 8) (Westerlund 2008, 14-16) .
It is against this complex background that Ingrian Finns returned to Finnish political discourse in a completely changed situation in international politics in the 1990s. In this situation the history between the Finns and the Ingrian Finns became not just the context but a topic of contention through which the Ingrian Finns' Finnishness was produced. We now turn to these discourses. of their Finnish language abilities, and this was taken up by the centre-right in Finnish politics, for whom the economic implications of migration, and the question of labour market integration for Ingrian Finns, was of particular concern.
In the Beginning: The Ingrian Finns as Lutherans
It is particularly noteworthy that the initial concern from the National Coalition Party noted "some degree of competence in the Finnish language", which suggests a differentiation between those who speak Finnish as a mother tongue and those who speak it as a second or learned language. Indeed, Kanerva describes those Ingrian Finns who do speak Finnish as having "adequate" language skills, again suggesting non-native or non-first language knowledge, which differentiates Ingrian Finns from the bulk of Finland's population. The discourse on integration capability was therefore in part a discussion on whether, in assuming Finnishness is thus "proved" by a shared collective memory of struggling against the USSR.
Anni Kangas (2011) Bergman 2013, 90), which may account for why negative presentations of Russianness in relation to Ingrian Finns were articulated primarily by members of that party.
Ethnicisation and its Discontents
We argue that analysis of the changing discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Return policy after Finns are presented now as Russians, or at least more connected to Russia than Finland.
Conclusions
Above we have shown that the political discussion on Ingrian Finnish return migration in religion was separated from other identity discourses by its largely 'cultural' function, whereas language, ancestry and history had more 'primordial' functions that allowed Finnish politicians to dismiss Ingrian Finnish migrants' integration capability in Finland. Essentially, had the political discourse on Ingrian Finns continued to note their shared Lutheran identity with Finland, it would have been more difficult to dismiss them as incapable of integration, whereas the primordial resources enabled exactly that. All the other resources could be flipped on their head, except Lutheranism.
The genealogy of the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return Law shows that in ethnically homogeneous contexts, discursive negotiation of national identity triggered by immigration becomes a case of defining who the immigrants are vis-à-vis the imagined majority community. When the discourse on what immigrants do or can do changes, the discourse on who they are can gain opposite meaning from the original, as the role of language in the discussion on the Ingrian Finns' integration capability shows. Paradoxically, the more essentialised the migrants' culture, the easier the discourse is to put into use for both ends.
